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I. INTRODUCTION
The breakup of the American Telephone & Telegraph Com-
pany' (AT&T) has caused a revolution in the structures used to
t Special Assistant Attorney General for the State of Minnesota, Mr. Nickolai re-
ceived his B.A. from Carthage College and his J.D. from Duke University. He formerly
served as a staff attorney for the Nebraska Public Service Commission and has authored
several articles including The Nebraska Pubhc Service Commission: Avenues for Reform, 9
CREIGHTON L. REV. 175 (1975). Mr. Nickolai has also co-authored Banks and Industrial
Revenue Bond Financing, 93 BANKING L.J. 306 (1976) and Railroad Abandonment. The Diap-
pearing Railroad Blues, 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 391 (1974).
The author would like to acknowledge the substantive contributions made to this Arti-
cle by Mr. L. J. Rotman.
1. Prior to the breakup, AT&T was composed of many companies which provided
all aspects of telephone service. These companies included Bell Operating Companies
(local service and intrastate long-distance), AT&T Long Lines (interstate long-distance
and manufacturing), Western Electric (research and development), and Bell Laboratories
(research and development). See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 461 F. Supp.
1314, 1317 n.1 (D.D.C. 1978). In 1982, Judge Harold Greene approved an antitrust con-
sent decree entered into between the Department of Justice and AT&T. See United States
v. Americal Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), ad sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 103 S. Ct. 1240 (1983); see also AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO.,
1982 ANNUAL REPORT 3-4 (1983) (AT&T's version of events culminating in divestiture).
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provide telecommunications service to American families and
businesses. The image of everybody's nanny, "Ma Bell," is rapidly
being replaced in the Midwest by Frederick Remington paintings
of American cowboys taming the West-compliments of the pub-
lic relations department of U.S. West, the new parent of North-
western Bell Telephone Company2 (NWB). Although attention
has focused on new concepts arising out of competition, such as
end-user access charges, premium access, bypass, and interconnect-
ing companies, it must turn to the inevitable result of the divesti-
ture-higher local rates.
In the wake of this revolution, one particular group stands to
suffer-the economically disadvantaged. Minnesota must act to
protect the ability of these individuals to have access to the tele-
phone network. To provide accessibility, the state must examine
its existing statutory framework governing telephone companies
after carefully delineating the social policy of providing universal
telephone service. The state must then ascertain the appropriate
market structure that best accommodates the concept of universal
service within the statutory framework. This Article addresses
each of these aspects in turn, concluding with a recommendation
of the appropriate market structure to accommodate the need of
all Minnesotans to have access to telephone service.
II. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EXISTING STATUTORY
FRAMEWORK
Telephone companies in the state are governed by Minnesota
Statutes chapter 237, 3 which was first enacted in 1915. 4 Chapter
2. See Arenson, U.S West: Building an Image, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1983, Business
Day, at 1.
3. MINN. STAT. §§ 237.01-.47 (1982 & Supp. 1983). Some form of regulation of the
telephone industry occurs in nearly every jurisdiction. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 37-2-1 to -
184 (1975 & Supp. 1983); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 44.21.300-.330 (Supp. 1983); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 40-201 to -442 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-1801 to -1820 (1947 & Supp.
1979); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 7901-7907 (West 1965 & Supp. 1983-1984); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 29-11-101 to -104 (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-228 to -262m
(West 1960 & Supp. 1983-1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, §§ 901-907 (1974 & Supp. 1982);
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 43-201 to -1711 (1981 & Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 362.01-.02
(West 1968); GA. CODE §§ 93-305 to -307 (1977 & Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 205-
4.5(7) (Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE §§ 62.801-05 (1983); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 134, §§ 1-21
(Smith-Hurd 1964 & Supp. 1983-1984); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1-17-1 to -29 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1983-1984); IOWA CODE §§ 476.1-.21 (West Supp. 1983-1984); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 66-104 to -1186 (1980 & Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 278.510-.540 (1981 & Supp.
1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, §§ 781-804 (West 1982 & Supp. 1984); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 2683-2689 (1964 & Supp. 1983-1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, §§ 1-
[Vol. 10
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237 is implemented by both the Public Utilities Commission
(Commission) and the Department of Public Service (Depart-
ment).5 Chapter 237 has remained virtually unchanged since its
enactment nearly seventy years ago. In 1978, the Minnesota
Supreme Court commented on the inadequacy of this statutory
structure in Arvig Telephone Company v. Northwestern Bell Telephone
Company: 6
In fairness to the litigants, it must be observed that at the heart
of the difficulty posed by this case is the somewhat antiquated
nature of the statutes with which we must deal. It seems plain
to us that much of the language in the existing statutes is de-
scended directly from a time when the structure of the tele-
phone industry in Minnesota was vastly different from its
present state.
7
Radical changes have occurred in the telecommunications indus-
try since Arvig, yet the vintage statutory structure generally re-
mains intact.
An illustration of the inadequacy of the statutory framework to
107 (1957 & Supp. 1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 166, §§ 1-44 (West 1976 & Supp.
1983-1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 484.1-.124 (West 1967 & Supp. 1983-1984);
MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 77-3-401 to -425 (1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 392.010-.360 (Vernon
1949 & Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 69-1-101 to -4-604 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 75-601 to -616 (1981 & Supp. 1982); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 704.010-.645, 707.300-.320
(1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 378:1-:31 (1966 & Supps. 1981 & 1983); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 48:17-1 to -21 (West 1940 & Supp. 1983-1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 63-9-1 to -19
(1978 & Supp. 1983); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW §§ 90-103 (McKinney 1955 & Supp. 1983-
1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 117.29-.35 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 49-21-01 to -21 (1978
& Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4931.01-.99 (Page 1977 & Supp. 1982); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 131-138 (West 1953 & Supp. 1983-1984); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 757.010-758.550 (1973 & Supp. 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, §§ 1101-1562 (Purdon
1959 & Supp. 1983-1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-3 (1969 & Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 58-9-10 to -2320 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 49-
30-1 to -32-16 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 65-29-101 to -132 (1982); TEX. UTIL. CODE
ANN. art. 1528c, §§ 1-34 (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 54-2-1 to -3-24 (1974 &
Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 2701-2706 (1970 & Supp. 1983); VA. CODE §§ 56-
485 to -508 (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 80.36-.270 (1962 & Supp. 1983-1984); W.
VA. CODE § 24-2-46 (1981 & Supp. 1983); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 196.01 (West 1957 & Supp.
1983-1984); Wyo. STAT. § 37-1-101(vi)(B) (1978).
4. See Act of Apr. 16, 1915, ch. 152, 1915 Minn. Laws 208 (current version at MINN.
STAT. §§ 237.01-.47 (1982 & Supp. 1983)).
5. Minnesota Statutes chapter 216A vests the Commission with legislative and
quasi-judicial functions while granting the Department the administrative function con-
nected with the regulatory process. See MINN. STAT. §§ 216A.05, .07 (1982 & Supp. 1983);
see also id § 237.02 (Commission and Department both vested with jurisdiction over tele-
phone companies). For a comprehensive analysis of the Commission's role, see Public Utli-
ties Symposiw, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 297 (1982).
6. 270 N.W.2d 111 (Minn. 1978).
7. Id at 115.
1984]
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respond to the modern telephone industry is its inability to miti-
gate the local network bypass threat. Local network bypass can be
accomplished either through private networks built by large cus-
tomers or through services based on new technology, such as inter-
active cable television.8 Bypass poses a threat to the Commission's
ability to create an appropriate market structure when the Com-
mission is unable to regulate bypass providers. The Commission's
inability to regulate every provider of telephone service precludes
full implementation of an appropriate market structure for the en-
tire state.
Under the present statutory framework, some providers of by-
pass systems effectively avoid the Commission's scrutiny, since the
Commission's jurisdiction extends only to "telephone companies."
A "telephone company" is defined by statute as "any person, firm,
association, or any corporation, private or municipal, owning or
operating any telephone line exchange for hire, wholly or partly
within this state, or furnishing any telephone service to the pub-
lic." 9 There are two important aspects of this definition-tele-
phone service and telephone service for hire.
In Minnesota Microwave, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 10 the Min-
nesota Supreme Court clarified the meaning of the term "tele-
phone service." The court reversed the Commission's attempt to
assert jurisdiction over a one-way microwave transmission system
offered by a telephone company:
[T]he system proposed in the instant dispute is not designed to
operate in conjunction with ordinary telephone service and in-
volves no two-way communicaton. It is not even designed to sup-
plement such communication. . . .Under such circumstances,
8. See Johnson, Why Local Rates Are Riszhg, REG., July-Aug. 1983, at 32-33 (concise
discussion of bypass technologies). Interactive cable television essentially is pay television
which "allow[s] subscribers to send as well as receive information. This technology makes
possible such services as impulse buying, pay-per-view, viewer polling, home security, and
medical emergency alarms." D. DELSON & E. MICHALOVE, DELSON'S DICTIONARY OF
CABLE, VIDEO & SATELLITE TERMS 40 (1983). See generally T. BALDWIN & D. McVoY,
CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 140-62 (1983); Branscomb, Telecommunications for the Future, in
AFTER THE AT&T SETTLEMENT: THE NEW TELECOMMUNICATIONS ERA 143 (P.L.I. Pat-
ents, Copyrights, Trademarks And Literary Property No. 155, 1982).
The use of other exchange services and exchange accesses by new technologies such as
cellular radio, cable, and optical fiber was not prevented in the AT&T breakup. See
United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 227-28 (D.D.C. 1982), af d
sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1240 (1983); Lavey & Carlton, Economic
Goals and Remedies of the A T&T Modifwd FinalJudgment, 71 GEO. L.J. 1497, 1501 (1983).
9. MINN. STAT. § 237.01, subd. 2 (1982).
10. 291 Minn. 241,190 N.W.2d 661 (1971).
[Vol. 10
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the nexus between such a system and the commission's man-
date to regulate telephone service is not apparent."
Under the court's requirement of two-way communication, many
providers of new technologies will fall within the statutory defini-
tion of telephone companies and under the auspices of the statu-
tory framework. 12 Thus, the Commission's jurisdiction extends to
providers of these forms of two-way communication and the threat
of network bypass is effectively controlled.
The second requirement of the statutory definition is that tele-
phone companies offer telephone service "for hire." This aspect of
the statutory definition arises where a large corporation finds it
cost efficient to construct its own internal telephone network, link-
ing its various facilities together and avoiding the local network.
In this context, the corporation may effectively bypass the local
network monopoly, because it will not offer telephone services "for
hire." Since the large corporation would not be a "telephone com-
pany" under the statute, the Commission would be without juris-
diction to include the corporation in its regulatory scheme. On the
other hand, a developer of an office or apartment building, con-
structing an internal communication network, operating it on be-
half of the occupants, and charging the occupants for the service,
would fall within the definition of a telephone company and there-
fore under the auspices of the statutory framework.1
3
11. Id at 249, 190 N.W.2d at 666-67 (emphasis added). The court's focus on the lack
of two-way communication represented a new position in Minnesota. In 1965, former
Minnesota Attorney General, Robert W. Mattson, addressed the issue of whether or not a
cable television provider was a "telephone company" within the definition set forth in the
statutory framework and held: "Since these businesses [cable providers] operate under
different methods of transmission than telephone companies, and perform different serv-
ices, they do not appear to be 'telephone companies' as defined in Sec. 237.01, and thus
are not subject to state regulation." Op. Att'y Gen., June 28, 1965, at 3 (citations
omitted).
12. Although cable companies are still not viewed as telephone companies today, they
do fall under the auspices of state regulation. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 238.01-.35 (1982 &
Supp. 1983); 4 MINN. CODE AGENCY R. §§ 4.001-.231 (1982). For an articulate discussion
of the federal and state regulation of cable, see Note, The Federal Communications Commission
and Interactive Cable Technolog,. The Case for Minimal Regulation, 97 HARV. L. REV. 565
(1983).
The ability to switch is essential in handling any type of two-way communication.
On June 28, 1983, Intelex, a Wisconsin partnership, applied for a Certificate of Public
Convenience to provide a guided light-wave common carrier public switched network in
Minnesota. See In re Application of Intelex, Docket No. P436/M-83-359 (Minn. P.U.C.
1983).
13. See MINN. STAT. § 237.01, subd. 2 (1982). In 1981, the legislature amended chap-
ter 237 in order to enhance the Commission's jurisdiction over smaller telephone networks,
offering a new definition of "independent telephone companies": "a telephone company
1984]
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In determining whether a provider of telephone service is sub-
ject to regulation, statutory reliance on the term "for hire" may
threaten the Commission's ability to create a market structure that
will properly serve the state. The distinction between the regula-
tion of the developer and the corporation based on whether a
charge is levied for the service must be eliminated to prevent net-
work bypass and to preserve the Commission's ability to regulate
the telephone industry. Once the threat of local network bypass is
ameliorated, the Commission can implement an appropriate mar-
ket structure which will ensure the availability of telephone service
to everyone.
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS-PROTECTION FOR THE
ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED
While the universal telephone service concept continues to be
debated in Washington, 14 the continued availability of telephone
service to low-income customers 15 must be a primary concern in
Minnesota. Medium and high-income customers will be able to
absorb the increased cost of basic residential telephone services;
large businesses will also fend for themselves. The question, how-
ever, is how the customer who lives on limited income will be able
to absorb substantial increases in the cost of basic telephone service
organized under chapter 301 and providing service to less than 2,500 subscribers within
the state." Act of May 21, 1981, ch. 248, § 1, 1981 Minn. Laws 1041, 1042 (current ver-
sion at MINN. STAT. § 237.01, subd. 3 (1982)). The legislature also provided that in-
dependent telephone companies were not subject to rate regulation unless they elected to
fall under the auspices of the Commission's authority. See id § 2, 1981 Minn. Laws at
1042 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 237.075, subd. 9 (1982)).
14. See Universal Telephone Service Preservation Act of 1983.Joint Hearings before the Commit-
tee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, and the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as Joint
Hearings].
Senate Bill 1660 and House Resolution 3621 comprised the Universal Telephone
Service Preservation Act (Act). Senate Bill 1660 is presently tabled in committee, as dis-
cussion centers on the FCC's Access Charge Order. House Resolution 3621 was consoli-
dated with a number of other resolutions into House Resolution 4102 which was adopted
by the House on November 10, 1983. See 129 CONG. REC. H9701 (daily ed. Nov. 10,
1983); see also id. at H9823 (clerk authorized to make corrections in H.R. 4102); cf. H.R.
4102, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., H.R. REP. No. 479, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-13 (1983).
15. The concept of universal service encompasses not only a concern for persons of
low-income levels, but also reflects a concern over rural consumers, who by their geo-
graphic proximity, reside in less cost-efficient areas. See 129 CONG. REC. H9643 (daily ed.
Nov. 10, 1983) (statement of Rep. Wirth); id at H9650 (statement of Rep. Ford); id at
H9652 (statement of Rep. Harkin). Although the concerns expressed over the economi-
cally disadvantaged are equally applicable to consumers in rural areas, specific aspects of
the rural problem are beyond the scope of this Article.
[Vol. 10
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without reducing his already minimal standard of living. 1 6 Recent
reports showing a sharp growth in poverty levels underscore the
need to address telephone service affordability for the economi-
cally disadvantaged. '
7
The concern over low-income customers is demonstrated by the
telephone industry's attempt to redefine the notion of universal tel-
ephone service, traditionally perceived as telephone service for eve-
ryone.18 The Chairman of the Board of AT&T, Charles Brown,
16. Perhaps the largest, most readily identifiable group within the expansive category
of "the economically disadvantaged" is the aged-those over 65. Congressman Roybal,
Chairman of the House Select Committee on Aging, addressed his concerns over the effect
of the AT&T breakup and the FCC proposed access charges on the aged. In supporting
House Resolution 4102, he stated:
The proposed increase in telephone rates as outlined by the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) will eliminate phone service for those who need
it the most-the rural, low-income, and elderly who are forced to rely on fixed
incomes for their existence. Almost 4 million persons 65 years of age and older
are below the poverty line in this country. For these individuals, the projected
long-term increase of as much as $16 per month in some rural areas will cause a
serious hardship. A CBS/New York Times news poll, shows that approximately
50 percent of those persons age 64 years believe they will no longer be able to
afford phone service if rates are doubled.
Id. at H9652 (statement of Rep. Roybal); see also Weier, Utility Services for Seniors- One
Example, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 22, 1983, at 35 (utility services must be modified to
accommodate the growing number of elderly persons). Congressman Wirth, one of the
sponsors of House Resolution 4102, also expressed concern for the aged: "What about the
aged, so many of whom live a very lonely existence? Are we going to make their lives even
more lonely because they cannot reach out and talk to a friend or a relative, a doctor or a
druggist?" 129 CONG. REC. H9643 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1983) (statement of Rep. Wirth).
Expanding on Congressman Wirth's comments, Congressman Leland emphasized that
"[p]hone service is literally a matter of life and death for many older Americans who
depend on a telephone as their only contact with the outside world." Id. at H9650 (state-
ment of Rep. Leland).
17. See By any calculation, poverty grows, St. Paul Pioneer Press, Feb. 24, 1984, at 9A, col.
1 (discussing census bureau's report that 15% of American population lived in poverty in
1982). The Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania may be required, for example, to
exclude low-income persons from access charges after a recent ruling by an administrative
law judge on the matter. See The March of Events.- ALJ Recommends No Access Charge For
Budget Customers, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 22, 1983, at 51.
18. The traditional notions of universal service were succinctly described by Senator
Packwood, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transporta-
tion and co-sponsor of Senate Bill 1660, see supra note 14, in his opening statement at the
Joint Hearings:
[F]or the better part of 200 years, this country has had a policy of attempting to
make. . . communications available to everybody in this country. . . . [Ilt has
been the policy of this Congress, administered by the Federal Communications
Commission. . . that we would use long-distance charges to help defray the cost
of rural and residential rates, and that we would not require rural and residen-
tial users to pay the full cost of providing their own telephone service. We
thought if we did that, there would be many areas of this country that could not
afford telephone service, and many people within even some areas of the country
that could afford it could not afford telephone service.
19841
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proffered the telephone industry's definition of universal service:
Although the concept of universal telephone service is a famil-
iar one, it is important to reiterate what the concept does and
does not embrace. Universal service means broad public access
to the telephone network. The goal of maintaining universal
service depends on keeping access afordable for those who would other-
wise leave the network. In contrast, universal service does not re-
quire that subsidized basic telephone service be provided to
those who can afford to pay its cost. Nor does it require unlim-
ited calling at flat monthly charges within any specified geo-
graphic areas. 19
Brown's definition inherently excludes those already unable to af-
ford telephone service and fails to comport with the traditional
concept of universal telephone service because it easily excludes
the economically disadvantaged.
The local telephone industry's definition of universal service also
disregards the concern over telephone service affordability for
Minnesota's low-income residents. In recent state access charge
proceedings, Dr. John Wenders, testifying on behalf of NWB, nar-
rowed the scope of the traditional universal service concept. He
stated that universal service is "[w]here everybody has a chance to
choose to come on the network or not at a price equal to marginal
cost."'20 On further questioning, Wenders testified that a customer
would need an income of at least twenty dollars per month to af-
ford telephone service; thus, a customer would have the choice of
telephone service.2 1 NWB's definition of universal telephone serv-
ice is analogous to providing universal physical access to pay tele-
phones, regardless of whether hopeful callers actually have
quarters in their pockets. Since Wender's definition of universal
service ignores the effect of pricing changes on a consumer's deci-
sion to remain connected to the system, it falls below the universal
service standard enunciated by Chairman Brown.22 Furthermore,
NWB's definition fails to satisfy the universal service objective set
forth by the FCC: "avoiding actions that would cause a signifi-
Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 1-2.
19. Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 279 (emphasis added).
20. 6 Transcript at 102, In re Investigation Into Intrastate Access Charges of Twenty-
Three Tel. Cos. Operating in the State of Minn., Docket No. PUC-83-102-HC (Minn.
P.U.C. 1983) (testimony of Dr. John T. Wenders, Professor of Economics, University of
Idaho).
21. See id at 103 (testimony of Dr. John T. Wenders).
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cant number of local exchange service subscribers to cancel that
service."
23
Dr. Wenders indicated that customers will discontinue their tel-
ephone service, by choice rather than through necessity, as the
price of the service increases. 24 Residential service and single-line
business service customers have a very inelastic demand. 25 Dr.
Wenders conceded, however, that low-income consumers have a
high elasticity of demand and are faced with a different set of
choices.26 For example, as telephone prices increase, a middle-in-
come customer may have to choose between paying higher tele-
phone rates or having optional leather seats in his next car
purchase. The choice for the low-income customer, on the other
hand, becomes one between higher telephone rates and groceries. 27
Dr. Wenders implied that low-income customers should not
have telephone service if they cannot afford it. He testified that
the person with a medical problem who needs a telephone to reach
help in a medical emergency has a personal problem; a problem
that the telephone rate structure is not bound to remedy.28 This
view represents a denial of the social obligation to assure that all
persons are afforded basic services and the social benefit derived
from open communications. If a segment of society is excluded
23. In re MTS & WATS Mkt. Structure, 93 F.C.C.2d 241, 266 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Access Charge Order], recon, granted, CC Docket No. 78-72, FCC 83-356 (released
Aug. 22, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Reconsideration Order]. The FCC's definition of univer-
sal telephone service in the Access Charge Order was adopted in the Reconsideration
Order. See Reconsideration Order, supra, at 2 n.2.
24. See 6 Transcript at 102-03, Docket No. PUC-83-102-HC (testimony of Dr. John
T. Wenders).
25. Elasticity of demand refers to the change in the amount of goods purchased in
response to the change in the price of the goods. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN
INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 364 (7th ed. 1967). Residential and single-line business cus-
tomers do not have readily available and affordable alternatives to the existing local tele-
phone network. As a result, when the price of telephone service increases, these customers
will be slow to leave the network. On the other hand, large businesses can create afforda-
ble alternatives to local network service by constructing their own internal networks. See
supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text (discussing local network bypass). Therefore,
large businesses will leave the local network when the price of service increases.
26. 6 Transcript at 103-04, Docket No. PUC-83-102-HC (testimony of Dr. John T.
Wenders).
27. Another example of the hard choices low-income consumers will be forced to
make if telephone rates are increased was expressed as follows: "My husband has a
breathing problem, so we have to run the air conditioner . . . [if] we have to choose be-
tween the two, the telephone will have to go!" 129 CONG. REC. H9652 (daily ed. Nov. 10,
1983) (statement of Rep. Harkin reading letter from a constituent).
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from the ability to contact others through telephone services, the
traditional concept of universal service is disparaged.
A cutback in basic telephone services would dramatically affect
the traditional concept of universal service that society has come to
expect. As Congressman Leland testified at the Joint Hearings on
the subject of universal service: "It is clear to all of us that in
modern society telephone service is not a luxury but a necessity.
For many Americans, the telephone is the principal or only com-
munications link to the outside world. '29 Congressman Harkin,
testifying at the same hearings, underscored the "necessity" of ac-
cess to the telephone network, as he read from a constituent's let-
ter: "'We need our telephone very badly. How can we get
emergency help, call our doctor and druggist? Most of us have
children and friends living many miles from us.'"30
Congressman Harkin's constituent raised concerns which paral-
lel the rationale underlying the "911" emergency telephone service
system now available in Minnesota. 31 The "911" system is
designed to provide convenient access to all emergency services.
The telephone network was selected as the appropriate means to
implement this objective. Although the legislature mandated the
establishment of an emergency telephone system,32 it failed to en-
sure that everyone had access to the system. 33 A cutback of basic
29. 129 CONG. REc. H9649 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1983) (statement of Rep. Leland).
Judge Harold Greene, in addressing the FCC's access charge decision, noted that:
This access charge decision undermines one of the assumptions underlying the
Court's approval of the decree-that there would be no impairment of the prin-
ciple of universal service-that is, that everyone, regardless of income, would
have access at least to a minimum of telephone service, in recognition of the fact
that this service is a necessity rather than a luxury.
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057, 1091 (D.D.C. 1983) (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted).
30. 129 CONG. REC. H9652 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1983) (statement of Rep. Harkin read-
ing from letter of constituent); see United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. at
1091 n. 146. According to Judge Greene:
One might consider, for example, such uses as the ability to reach fire, police,
and other emergency services; the need of the elderly to reach physicians, close
relatives, or others who might give them aid; and the desire of those in isolated
areas of the country for contact with others.
Id
31. In 1977, the legislature authorized implementation of an emergency telephone
system. See Act of May 27, 1977, ch. 311, 1977 Minn. Laws 627 (current version at MINN.
STAT. §§ 403.01-.12 (1982)). Pursuant to section 403.07, the Department of Administra-
tion promulgated standards supplementing the statutory framework. See 2 MINN. CODE
AGENCY R. §§ 1.6101-.6115 (1982).
32. See Act of May 27, 1977, ch. 311, § 1, 1977 Minn. Laws 627, 628 (current version
at MINN. STAT. § 403.01, subd. 1 (1982)).
33. In a rather superficial effort, the legislature required that "[b]y December 15,
[Vol. 10
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telephone services would further erode the ability of the state's res-
idents to utilize the "911" system to obtain emergency services.
Without the telephone at his ready disposal, Alexander Graham
Bell may well have been left without assistance when he uttered:
"Mr. Watson-come here-I want to see you."
34
Restricting the availability of basic telephone services may seri-
ously impair economic efficiency. As Congressman Wirth ob-
served during the Joint Hearings on universal service:
[O]ne major contributor to economic efficiency is universal
service. The fact that 91 percent and hopefully 100 percent of
households would have a telephone contributes. . . to the eco-
nomic well-being of this society . . . tying everybody together.
But beyond that, [it ensures] that people can call a Sears and
Roebuck, or that . . .Citibank is in touch, can be in touch
with all of the consumers in New York City, for example.
35
Cutbacks in telephone service would not only have an immediate
impact on economic efficiency, but the "drop in phone use would
also create a ripple effect in which the fixed costs would have to be
shared by fewer users, resulting in further rate increases and still
more residents forced to do without a telephone.
'36
Thus, at a minimum, the traditional concept of universal service
must be preserved to protect the economically disadvantaged.
Universal service confers not only individual benefits but societal
1986, each public utility providing telephone service within a 911 service area shall convert
every pay station telephone to permit dialing of the 911 number without coin or other
charge to the caller." Id § 4, 1977 Minn. Laws at 629 (current version at MINN. STAT.
§ 403.04, subd. 2 (1982)) (emphasis added). Adequate service to urban areas, however,
would require that every block be equipped with its own pay phone; rural areas, on the
other hand, would require a pay phone outside each residence. The Commission regula-
tions, however, provide:
In each exchange located in an incorporated village the telephone utility shall
supply at lease one coin telephone that will be available to the public on a 24-hour
basis. This coin telephone shall be located in a prominent location in the ex-
change and shall be lighted at night. The utility may also establish other public
telephone service locations where the public convenience will be served. This
requirement may be waived by the Commission in cases of abusive vandalism or
damage.
4 MINN. CODE AGENCY R. PSC 210 (1982) (emphasis added). The public utilities' mo-
nopoly over public pay phones is currently being challenged in Minnesota. Therefore, the
reference to "public utilities" in section 403.04 may circumvent the legislative intent of
ensuring comprehensive 911 service where practical.
34. See DeMott, Click/ Ma Bell Is Ringing 0f, TIME, Nov. 21, 1983, at 61.
35. Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 90-91; see 129 CONG. REc. H9643 (daily ed. Nov.
10, 1983) (statement of Rep. Wirth) ("Businesses will lose if the poor, without telephones,
are unable to dial those 800 numbers to order a product.").
36. 129 CONG. REc. H9650 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1983) (statement of Rep. Leland).
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benefits as well. Once access to the telephone network is hindered,
universal service is impossible. Therefore, to prevent the loss of
universal service and to promote the public welfare, the Commis-
sion must ensure access to the telephone network. Alternative
models of industry structure can accommodate the concern for
providing this access and must therefore be closely examined.
IV. ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
The industry model best suited to meet the needs of Minnesota
telephone customers must be selected before the adequacy of the
existing legal framework and its ability to provide universal service
can be evaluated. Three readily identifiable models of the intra-
state telecommunications industry are unfettered competition, reg-
ulated competition, and restricted competition. An examination
of each of these industry models precedes a recommendation to
combine the models to serve Minnesota in the wake of the AT&T
divestiture.
A. Unfettered Competition
-The unfettered competition model, or deregulation, assumes
that regulation is no longer necessary since the efficiency of the
marketplace will provide adequate communication services to the
public. 37 The theory of competition is premised on Adam Smith's
notion of the "Invisible Hand," guiding individual firms to act
freely and pursue their own self interests, achieving the best for
all.3 8 Smith's notion, when carried forward today, is based on the
belief that competition, or at least the threat of competition, will
ensure the availability of telephone service at a reasonable price to
the consumer.
Competition, or potential competition, exists for all forms of
communication services. If the existence of actual or potential
37. Since the AT&T breakup was the result of an antitrust case, the unfettered com-
petition model reflects the fundamental goal of the antitrust laws. See Lavey & Carlton,
supra note 8, at 1498. See generally I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 103-
12 (1978) (goals of antitrust laws are to maximize economic efficiency and promote public
welfare). For a comprehensive discussion of the causes and effects of deregulating the
telephone industry, see Baker & Baker, Antitnst and Communications Deregulation, 28 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 1 (1983); Katz & Willig, The CaseforFreeingAT&T, REG., July-Aug. 1983, at
43.
38. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORM-
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519competition restrains the pricing priorities of existing providers of
telephone services and benefits the public welfare, then regulation
is misplaced. Thus, for five dollars per month and a touch tone
phone, the consumer can enter the world of competitive communi.
cations by subscribing to long-distance services offered by compa.nies such as MCI and GTE.39
Total deregulation, however, has not been formally proposed in
Minnesota.40 Nevertheless, the groundwork is being laid for such a39. One aspect of the AT&T breakup was to create calling
Aces rnsotAreas (LAT~s) in which local oea cligareas, known as LocalAccess Transport AesLA s)iwhc 
oprting companies are permitted to
provide telephone service See United State v. Western Elec. Co., 1983-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH 16,333 at 9, * e v.Wesert  Elc. o.,aniesarepradted 
to
(CCH) 65,333, at 69,970 (D.D.C. 1983). LATA approval occurred in 1983 See United
States v. Western Elec. Co., No. 82-0192, slip op. at 104-16 (D.D.C. July 8, 1983); Westrn
E lec Co., 1983-1 T rade C as (C C ) I 6,333 T he follow ing diagram p ortrays the liveLATAs which are contained in Minnesota.
Minnesota, North Dakotaand South Dakota LANAs3 TELENEWS (Minnesota ed.) (reprinted with the permission of Northwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co.). Local operating companies cannot provide inter-LATA services. ,ee Wester
Ele. Co., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 69,970, Therefore, calls between LATAs must be
carried by an inter-LATA carrier such as AT&T MCI, or Sprint. See mu
40. NWB however, has proposed price deregulation on certain central office and
long-distance services in filings with the Commission, See In re Three Tariffs Filed By
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. Requesting the Repricing of CENTREX & the Detariffing of
C ENTRON, Docket N os p '4 1 M 8 -4 ercn fC N R X &t eD trf go
ENTre Dk Nos. -421/,4
8 4 -2 4 , P-421/M-
8 4 -2 5 , P-421/M-84-2
6 (Minn. P.U.C.
1983); see also Besen & Woodbury, 
Regulattbn, 
De"
"io 1-d-1 9 , 
2 8 
ANTITRUST BULL. 3(98)pZ allnd a'a nt irus b? the Te/ecommunca-
dtsi~ntut,Arer~usT as. the a(1983) 
(proposing total deregulation of AT&T after
rates, Mineapos StaroprteFCC 
reponse); Carideo, &/l chief.,aYs market should set phone
Genei 
r & Trib., Feb. 27, 1984, 'J, at col. 2 (NWB Chief Executive Officer,
GeeBier, Proposed total deregulation).
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proposal. In a recent hearing concerning the development of in-
trastate access charges, Dr. John Wenders, testifying on behalf of
NWB, stated that, although actual competition in many markets
was unwarranted, potential competition operated to keep rates
down to cost levels.41 Wenders also noted that Minnesota's future
should hold a deregulated telephone industry.
42
Deregulation could be secured in Minnesota by repealing the
entire existing statutory structure. If the statutory framework were
repealed, telephone service providers, such as NWB, could be sub-
jected to the basic consumer protection laws with which all compe-
titive firms must comply.43 Moreover, repeal of Minnesota's
statutory framework would eliminate the costs of regulation 44 and
allow competition to function freely.
Deregulation assumes that competition will provide service on
terms suitable to all portions of society.45 This assumption, how-
ever, is premised on the theory that consumers will be able to pay
the marginal cost 46 of basic necessities. This theory overlooks con-
sumers at the poverty level.
Another pitfall of the deregulation theory is the assumption that
true competition will result. In a recent article, Dr. Lee Selwyn
41. See 6 Transcript at 112-13, Docket No. PUC-83-102-HC (testimony of Dr. John
T. Wenders).
42. See 7 Transcript at 29, Docket No. PUC-83-102-HC (testimony of Dr. John T.
Wenders).
43. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 325D.01-. 16 (1982).
44. The Department alone employs twenty-eight persons in its Utilities Division and
is represented by five attorneys from the Attorney General's Office in discharging its statu-
tory responsibility.
At the national level, the costs of regulation are also considerable. Yet when com-
mentators discuss these costs, they fail to take into account the benefits of regulation-
telephone service for everyone. As two authors have noted:
The social costs of regulating AT&T's long-distance operations are very high.
Currently, each AT&T rate change is subject to FCC approval on the basis of
mechanistic criteria which, by their nature, are not flexible enough to reflect
changing market conditions. These rates deter AT&T from aggressive pricing,
marketing, and investment strategies that would benefit its customers. They also
put it at a disadvantage that may cause it to lose business to less efficient but
unencumbered competitors. . . . If regulation is continued, innovation will be
dampened, and costs and prices will be higher industry-wide than they otherwise
would need to be.
Katz & Willig, supra note 37, at 44.
45. See F. SCHERER, supra note 38, at 11-19.
46. Marginal cost is the incremental cost of producing the next unit without regard to
the initial investment or fixed costs attributable to producing such unit. See P. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 195 (3d ed. 1981); R. PIERCE, JR., G.
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pointed out that AT&T controls over ninety percent of the inter-
exchange market and that in the remaining ten percent, AT&T
facilities are used by other carriers to provide telephone service.4 7
Dr. Selwyn observed that "[a]s long as AT&T still maintains effec-
tive control of such facilities, the mere existence of other suppliers
does not protect customers from excessive rates.''48
B. Regulated Competition
Regulated competition provides another alternative industry
model for the state to consider. Creating a market structure based
on this model assumes that there are benefits to be obtained from
competition, but that due to market imperfection or other social
needs, regulatory intervention is necessary to obtain the desired
objective.
49
Regulated competition in the telephone industry could take
myriad forms. Rates for toll calls could be regulated by route,50 by
company, or by statewide averages. For example, the Commission
could require a telephone company to charge rates based on its
average cost per mile5' to all Minnesota customers or on its cost for
each route. Alternatively, the price could be based on the average
cost of all companies offering toll service. The revenues could then
be pooled and divided among the companies. A regulated market
structure could require, for example, that the price of a call from
Minneapolis to Duluth over a company's facilities be based on
either the average cost of all companies offering toll services, the
47. See Selwyn, Managers Face Challenges in New Industy Created by Deregulation and Di-
vestiture, COM. NEWS, July 1983, at 66E.
48. Id
49. See F. SCHERER, supra note 38, at 520. An example of regulatory intervention to
satisfy objectives of fulfilling social needs is found in the health care industry, where hospi-
tals are required to serve a particular number of indigent patients to qualify for certain
federal benefits. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1976); see also Wyoming Hosp. Ass'n v.
Harris, 527 F. Supp. 551 (D. Wyo. 1981) (indigent requirements are valid).
50. For example, telephone companies could be required to charge no more than 5.20
per minute for a phone call from Minneapolis to Duluth or each company could fix its
price by route subject to a standard of reasonableness.
51. Under this approach, each company could charge its average cost for each mile of
the call. Thus, rates would differ among companies depending on their average per mile
costs. Rates, however, would be uniform within the particular company's route structure.
The FCC has adopted an approach whereby customers would be charged a flat rate
for access to long-distance telephone service. See Access Charge Order, supra note 23, at 244.
One commentator is sharply critical of this approach, arguing that telephone costs are
usage sensitive and not conducive to a flat customer charge. See Wilson, Telephone Access
Costs and Rates, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 15, 1983, at 19.
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average cost of that company's intrastate Minnesota operations, or
that company's cost of providing the service.
The combined effect of regulated competition's various choices
yields one result-if all companies' costs were averaged, the cus-
tomer would not perceive a difference between service providers.
Thus, price competition, a primary purpose of competition, would
be lost. As more providers were introduced into the regulated
scheme, price competition would emerge, but not without creating
further problems. For example, if prices were based on a tele-
phone company's average Minnesota intrastate costs, that com-
pany would have an incentive to serve only high-density/low-cost
routes. With pricing based on average intrastate costs, the com-
pany would gain much of the traffic over the high-density/low-
cost routes. As the company gained more traffic, its customers
would benefit. To the extent that NWB and AT&T, for example,
provided universal service52 to all routes, regardless of cost or den-
sity, the higher cost routes would become their only sources of rev-
enue. As a result, NWB and AT&T's needs would rise, which
would, in turn, force their average rates to increase.
Even if the Commission were to allow rates set by route rather
than by average costs, practical problems would remain. Allowing
rates set by route for each firm would provide, in essence, that any
firm that had a cost advantage on that route would .have a price
advantage. If, as is likely, one company's cost of capacity to serve
the Duluth to Minneapolis route is less than the average cost of
another company's service, customers served by the company with
the lower cost of capacity would be better off. Should the com-
pany with the higher cost be permitted to base its rates on a pure
marginal cost by route, however, such rates would probably force
the other company out of business. Another alternative would be
to price on a per route marginal cost basis, but with an additional
charge to reflect a share of the historic average cost. 53
52. For an extended discussion of the universal telephone service concept, see supra
notes 14-36 and accompanying text.
53. These rate alternatives are not merely academic. The proper cost standard for
deaveraged prices in regulated competition was addressed by the United States Supreme
Court in American Commercial Lines v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 392 U.S. 571 (1968).
In American Commercial Lines, the Court upheld a decision of the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) that load rates based on an avoided cost standard were unreasonable.
The Court reversed the decision of a three-judge court, 268 F. Supp. 71 (W.D. Ky. 1967),
which had held that the ICC's determination was erroneous. See Amen'an Commercal Lines,
392 U.S. at 574.
The railroads sought to use an avoided cost standard to meet the rates being charged
[Vol. 10
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Apparently, Minnesota's statutory framework allows a form of
regulated competition, at least for toll and local rural services.
The Commission has the power to authorize the construction of
any number of facilities for furnishing "local rural or toll tele-
phone" service,54 despite the existence of an operating telephone
system. 55 Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 237.16, the
Commission must first hold a public hearing and find that the
"public convenience requires such proposed telephone lines or
equipment" be installed.
56
The Minnesota Supreme Court has examined the breadth of
section 237.16 and determined that the Commission does not have
a broad grant of power to authorize a monopolistic structure. In
Arvig, the court stated that:
Section 237.16 . . . functions essentially as an antiduplication
statute. Its purpose is to eliminate costly, inefficient duplica-
tion of equipment. . . . [A] telephone company desiring to
take action which could conflict with the purpose of the statute
by barge-truck lines. Id at 575-77. The Court required the railroads to use a fully distrib-
uted method of examining costs. See id at 594. The Court adopted the ICC definition of
Ai.y ditrtbuted costs as the " 'out-of-pocket costs plus a revenue-ton and revenue ton-mile
distribution of the constant costs, including deficits, [that] indicate the revenue necessary
to a fair return on the traffic, disregarding ability to pay.' " Id at 575 n.3 (quoting New
Autos. in Interstate Commerce, 259 I.C.C. 475, 513 (1945)) (brackets in original). The
fully distributed cost to the railroads in Amerilan Commercial Lines was $7.59 per ton. Id at
575-76. Yet the joint rate charged by the railroads was $5.19 per ton. Id at 576.
Under the fully distributed method, the railroads' rates went up and potential rail-
road traffic went elsewhere. Thus, the question of the proper relationship between prices,
costs, and competition in a regulatory environment is not merely speculative.
54. Minnesota's statutory framework implicitly requires some degree of monopoly au-
thority, rather than regulated competition, for non-rural local service. The statutory
framework provides for the issuance of a certificate of territorial authority by the Commis-
sion. See MINN. STAT. § 237.16, subd. 2 (1982). When more than one telephone company
files competing maps, the Commission must determine which of the companies is entitled
to a certificate. See id Monopoly authority is also implied by subdivision 4 of section
237.16 which forbids construction of any line, plant, or system without first securing both
a declaration of public convenience and a new certificate of territorial authority. See id
§ 237.16, subd. 4. Subdivision 4 limits the requirements necessary for a telephone com-
pany already operating in Minnesota, providing that:
[T]his section shall not be construed to require a telephone company operating
an exchange in Minnesota to secure a certificate for an extension within any
territory within which such company has heretofore filed maps or for substitute
facilities within such territories, or for extensions into territories contiguous to
that already occupied by such company and not receiving similar service from
another company if no certificate of territorial authority has been issued to or
applied for by any other company.
Id
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must first persuade the Public [Utilities] Commission that the
proposed action would further the public convenience.
5 7
In Paul Bunyan Rural Telephone Cooperative v. Pterce, 5 8 the court re-
versed a Commission decision which granted exclusive territorial
rights to one company and directed another firm to remove its fa-
cilities from the area. The court held that:
[Nowhere in. . . § 237.16, is there any provision under which
the commission would be authorized to grant exclusive rights in
a given territory to any telephone company outside of a munici-
pality. . . . Under that section as applied herein, the most the
commission could do would be to authorize duplication of lines,
equipment, and service in the area under question, and this
only after a public hearing on the question of public
convenience.
59
The statutory framework therefore allows duplication in local ru-
ral and toll service. The only remaining question is what evidence
is necessary to establish that duplication meets the public conven-
ience test.
The Arvig court implied broad Commission discretion in deter-
mining when the public convenience standard is met:
[T]he commission has been made the guardian of the public
interest in continuity of service and nonduplication of facili-
ties. . . . Since the statutes fairly indicate that the legislature
intended the commission to rule on such questions, we find it
unnecessary to restrict the commission to one provision or the
other on the facts of this case.6°
Non-rural local services are thus, by implication, subject to the
exclusive service provisions of section 237.16.61 Without statutory
change, however, the Commission does not have the express au-
thority to regulate the provision of non-rural local services. 62 The
57. Arig, 270 N.W.2d at 116.
58. 263 Minn. 14, 115 N.W.2d 661 (1962).
59. Id at 19-20, 115 N.W.2d at 665 (emphasis in original).
60. Ar'g, 270 N.W.2d at 116.
61. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing implicit authority of Com-
mission to permit monopoly structure for non-rural local service). The exclusive service
provision of section 237.16 is contained in subdivision 4. See MINN. STAT. § 237.16, subd.
4 (1982).
62. The Commission is currently considering a matter which involves the issue of
whether the resale of a coin operated telephone service is the resale of a local service,
which should be prohibited, or whether it is an ancillary service which can be competi-
tively offered by any provider. See Air-Ports Sys. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Docket
No. P-421/C-82-4645 (Minn. P.U.C. 1983).
The threat of local network bypass, supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text, may
[Vol. 10
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol10/iss3/7
FOR WHOM WILL THE BELL TOLL?
Commission's authority to allow duplication of local rural and toll
service and to select the form of pricing for regulated competition
presently ensures that the economically disadvantaged receive tele-
phone service.
C Intrastate Monopoly
The third industry model for the state to consider is intrastate
monopoly. This model is premised on the belief that:
[T]he minimum optimal scale of production is so large that
there is room in a given market for only one or at most a very
few firms realizing all production and distribution economies of
scale. . . . A monopolist therefore can enjoy lower unit costs
than a group of small-scale competitors could.
63
The intrastate monopoly model involves a single provider of local
service as well as a separate provider of intrastate long-distance
service. 64 The policies adopted by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) in the AT&T divestiture reflect the goals of the
antitrust laws, which are designed to encourage competition. 65
The state can, however, create local monopolies for intrastate, lo-
cal exchange, and interexchange services. 66
mitigate any of the Commission's efforts to regulate the rate structure of telephone service.
See Johnson, supra note 8, at 33-35.
63. F. SCHERER, supra note 38, at 519-20. See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
supra note 37, at 403b-c (discussing economic effects of monopoly structure).
64. There are two distinct long-distance markets: a market for intrastate intra-LATA
calls and another for inter-LATA calls. See supra note 39 (discussing LATAs).
65. See Lavey & Carlton, supra note 8, at 1498. Areeda and Turner have commented
on the policy underlying the antitrust laws:
The central thrust of the antitrust laws is preserving competition in those mar-
kets where competitive policy has not been displaced by direct governmental
regulation or exemption. Preserving competition may promote some goals of an
essentially non-economic nature. Competitive processes substitute impersonal
and hence more tolerable market decisions for the dictates of private decision-
makers, and for the governmental bureaucratic controls to which unchecked pri-
vate power may otherwise lead. A competitive policy contributes to a wider
dispersal of business assets and to a broadening of independent entrepreneurial
opportunities, which may be thought to produce a more satisfactory social and
political climate.
II P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 37, at 401 (footnote omitted). See generally R.
POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIc NOTES AND OTHER
MATERIALS 152-70 (2d ed. 1981) (discussing rationale underlying antitrust laws).
66. Historically, state public utilities commissions (PUCs) have had the authority to
regulate telephone services within their states. See Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S.
133, 148 (1930). The allocation of jurisdiction between state PUCs and the FCC was not
affected by the divestiture of AT&T. See Comment, An Assessment of State and Federaljfans-
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Although the Commission does not presently have the explicit
statutory authority to authorize a monopoly market structure, im-
plicitly, it can occur. The Commission may restrictively exercise
its authority to grant approval for the construction of local serv-
ices67 and allow duplication of local rural and toll services only
after a finding that the public convenience requires such duplica-
tion.6 The Commission can then conclude, as a matter of policy,
that such duplication is not in the public interest. 69 The grant of a
local monopoly and an intrastate toll monopoly will not, however,
prevent bypass of the network by a large business.70 Some bypass
will be inevitable, even if the Commission determines to require
monopolization. Nevertheless, the Commission's scope of author-
ity will allow it sufficient control over the providers of telephone
service to ensure that the economically disadvantaged receive min-
imal telephone service.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The revolution in the telecommunications industry poses serious
challenges to Minnesota regulators. The choices made will affect
the price and quality of telephone service for years to come. De-
regulation, regulated competition, and remonopolization affect
different groups of consumers in various ways. The state must cre-
ate a telephone service market structure to insure that low-income
customers are not excluded from basic telephone services. To ac-
complish this objective, the market should be structured to permit
monopolization of local exchange service and regulation of toll
services.
A. Local Exchange Service as a Monopoly Service
A monopoly of the local exchange service is necessary to ensure
that both high and low-cost areas receive local service. 7' If dupli-
67. The Commission has "the exclusive right to grant authority to any telephone com-
pany to construct telephone lines or exchanges for furnishing local service to subscribers in
any municipality of this state, and to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which con-
struction may be carried on .... ".MINN. STAT. § 237.16, subd. 1 (1982) (emphasis
added).
68. See id; see also Aroig, 270 N.W.2d at 116 (Commission has authority to determine
"public convenience").
69. See Paul Bunyan, 263 Minn. at 19-20, 115 N.W.2d at 665.
70. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text (discussing effect of local network
bypass).
71. Rural areas are considered high-cost areas because of the disparate geographic
proximity of one rural residence to another and the distance to switching stations, which
[Vol. 10
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cation is permitted in some local areas, the local telephone com-
pany will be left with an investment in unused facilities and
customers only in high-cost areas. These results will drive up the
cost of service even further for the customers remaining on the
network.
To ensure the continued monopoly of local exchange service, the
Commission should exercise its statutory authority to prevent du-
plication of facilities.72 The Commission can apply the definition
of communications found in Minnesota Microwave, 73 guaranteeing
that two-way communication service is not duplicated through
cable technology or satellite dishes. 74 Additional statutory clarifi-
cation, including a specific prohibition on the public offering of
switched two-way communication services, will aid in discourag-
ing local bypass.
A local exchange monopoly is also necessary because it will al-
low the telephone service provider an opportunity to discriminate
in its pricing. Price discrimination 75 is necessary to continue the
availability of local telephone services at affordable prices. With a
discriminatory pricing policy, the majority of telephone customers
could provide a subsidy, ensuring the availability of telephone
service to persons unable to pay the full cost. Price discrimination
can thus ensure the continuation of traditional universal telephone
service.
76
are logically located in urban areas. See 129 CONG. REc. H9650 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1983)
(statement of Rep. Leland); id at H9652-53 (statement of Rep. Harkin).
72. See MINN. STAT. § 237.16 (1982).
73. 291 Minn. at 241, 190 N.W.2d at 661.
74. For a discussion of the potential of new technology to provide two-way, interac-
tive communication, see supra note 10 and accompanying text. See generally supra notes 8-
13 and accompanying text (discussing methods of local network bypass).
75. Price discrimination "is the sale (or purchase) of different units of a good or serv-
ice at price differentials not directly related to differences in the cost of supply." F. SCHER-
ER, supra note 38, at 495.
The FCC has already authorized states to price discriminate in permitting waiver of
access charges for long-distance service in certain instances. See Access Charge Order, supra
note 23, at 282; Reconsideration Order, supra note 23, at 9; see also Johnson, supra note 8, at
51 ("If [the access charge is waived] only [for] the poor (food stamp recipients, for exam-
ple), the burden imposed on local calls might be small enough that uneconomic bypass
would not be serious problem."); Cariedo, supra note 40, at 8J, col. 4 (Gene Bier, NWB
Chief Executive Officer, stated that NWB should not be required to waive long-distance
access charges for lower income customers).
76. The use of price discrimination operates as a subsidy for the economically disad-
vantaged and is a well known device to state and federal regulators. Two commentators
have noted:
State and federal regulators have subsidized local service out of long-distance
revenues on the theory that local customers should be allowed to 'share' in the
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Price discrimination can be targeted through the mechanism
used to implement the "cold weather" rule.7 7 The cold weather
rule offers protection from gas and electricity shutoffs during the
winter months to persons meeting certain income criteria, 78 al-
lowing them to spread their payments over the summer months.
The cold weather rule is easily administered, since the Commission
becomes involved only when a utility company appeals a cus-
tomer's claim for eligibility. 79 Although the process used for in-
voking the cold weather rule is imperfect, it provides an efficient
means of identifying needy customers.
Persons who meet the income tests used for the cold weather
productivity gains of AT&T's long-distance enterprise. Moreover, there appears
to be an economic justification for subsidization of local rates: The addition of
each new local subscriber benefits existing users by expanding the reach of their
telephones; thus (long-distance) subscribers should subsidize others to stay on the
system.
MacAvoy & Robinson, Winning By Losing: The A T&T Settlement and Its Impact on Telecommu-
nications, 1 YALE J. REG. 1, 36 (1983) (footnote omitted). The rationale applied by Mac-
Avoy and Robinson to support their position on a long-distance subsidy is equally
applicable in providing telephone service to the economically disadvantaged through local
exchange price discrimination. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 35-36; see also Cornell,
Pelcovits & Brenner, A Legacy of Regulatomy Failure, REG., July-Aug. 1983, at 42 (discussing
the effect of subsidies on local rates).
77. See 4 MINN. CODE AGENCY R. § 3.0299 (1982). The cold weather rule is:
prescribed by the Commission pursuant to Minn. Stat. ch. 216B, in its entirety
and in particular §§ 216B.01, 216B.08, 216B.09 and 216B.23, and the Public
Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3201 et. seq. and 16
U.S.C. §§ 2601 et. seq. to prohibit disconnection of a residential utility customer
who is unable to pay for utility service during cold weather months.
Id § 3.0299 A.
The procedure available to obtain relief under the cold weather rule is straightfor-
ward. A utility must, prior to disconnecting the service of any residential unit, serve upon
the customer: "a. A commission approved Notice of Proposed Disconnection; b. A Notice
of Residential Customer Rights and Possible Assistance; and c. A . . . postage prepaid
form on which a residential customer . . . may declare his or her inability to pay." Id
§ 3.0299 E. 1. Essentially, the utility cannot disconnect service for ten days following the
initial mailing. See id § 3.0299 E. 2. After this ten-day period, the utility may disconnect
the service if the customer has not responded. See id Actual disconnection is governed by
a number of sections, each pertaining to specific circumstances. See, e.g., id PSC 298
(§ 3.0298) (disconnection of service generally); id § 3.0299 H. (disconnection of poten-
tially unoccupied units); id PSC 300 (§ 3.0300) (procedure for notice of disconnection
generally); id PSC 301 (§ 3.0301) (manner of disconnection).
78. See id § 3.0299 F.
79. If the customer responds to the utility's notice within the prescribed time period,
stating that he is unable to pay, the utility may accept the customer's declaration and
refrain from disconnecting service. See id § 3.0299 E. 3. Should the utility appeal the
customer's declaration to the Commission, the customer must furnish proof of eligibility to
the Commission which then rules on the customer's eligibility. Id § 3.0299 G. 6.-.7. The
criteria for the Commission's determination of the customer's inability to pay covers many
aspects of the customer's economic condition. See id § 3.0299 F. 2-3.
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rule should be permitted to obtain basic access at one-half of the
regular local access rate. The resulting revenue deficiency could
be spread to the remaining residential and single-line business cus-
tomers. The testimony in access charge cases revealed that resi-
dential and single-line business customers have the least elastic
demand. 80 Therefore, these customers provide the most efficient
means of spreading the cost of the subsidy. Since the legality of
Commission-directed targeted rate discrimination could be subject
to challenge, specific statutory language authorizing and directing
the Commission to promulgate rules on such discrimination
should be enacted.
B. Toll Services as Regulated Competition
Toll services should be subject, at least for a few years, to a regu-
lated competition scheme. Eventually, these services could be
deregulated. Continuing regulation, however, would ensure the
state's ability to maintain a minimum service obligation and to
guarantee that at least one carrier will serve every route. Deregu-
lation of toll services on a route-by-route basis should be permitted
after a sufficient period of regulation to allow the benefits of com-
petition to flow to the users of high-density/low-cost routes. The
statutory framework should be amended to guarantee that the
Commission has specific authority to require firms to provide serv-
ice to otherwise unserved routes; thus assuring that telephone serv-
ice is available to all routes.
VI. CONCLUSION
The policy choices affecting the structure of the telecommunica-
tions industry in Minnesota require a balancing of economic effi-
ciency and social policies. Economic efficiency arguments cannot
always meet the greater social goals of interaction between every
segment of society and the maintenance of a minimum quality of
life for those who do not enjoy the fruits of a wealthy society. The
structure proposed in this Article would allow the state to meet
those minimal social goals while providing the benefits of a com-
petitive market structure to a substantial segment of the telecom-
munications market.
80. See III Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. Additional Testimony & Exhibits, Sept. 30,
1983, at G.2-3, In re Investigation Into Intrastate Access Charges of Twenty-Three Tel.
Cos. Operating in the State of Minn., Docket No. PUC-83-102-HC (Minn. P.U.C. 1983)
(testimony of Clark D. Hammelman).
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